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Despite high vaccination coverage in most European 
countries, large community outbreaks of measles do occur, 
normally clustered around schools and resulting from 
suboptimal vaccination coverage. To determine whether or 
when it is worth implementing outbreak-response vaccination 
campaigns in schools, we used stochastic outbreak models 
to reproduce a public school outbreak in Germany, where 
no vaccination campaign was implemented. We assumed 
2 scenarios covering the baseline vaccination ratio range 
(91.3%–94.3%) estimated for that school and computed 
outbreaks assuming various vaccination delays. In one 
scenario, reacting (i.e., implementing outbreak-response 
vaccination campaigns) within 12–24 days avoided large 
outbreaks and reacting within 50 days reduced outbreak 
size. In the other scenario, reacting within 6–14 days 
avoided large outbreaks and reacting within 40 days 
reduced the outbreak size. These are realistic time frames 
for implementing school outbreak response vaccination 
Effectiveness and Timing 
of Vaccination during School 
Measles Outbreak 
Axel Antonio Bonačić Marinović, Corien Swaan, Ole Wichmann, Jim van Steenbergen, 
and Mirjam Kretzschmar
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 18, No. 9, September 2012 1405
Author affi liations: National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands (A.A. Bonačić 
Marinović, C. Swaan, J. van Steenbergen, M. Kretzschmar); 
University Medical Centre Utrecht, Utrecht, the Netherlands (A.A. 
Bonačić Marinović, M. Kretzschmar); Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, 
Germany (O. Wichmann); and Leiden University Medical Centre, 
Leiden, the Netherlands (J. van Steenbergen)
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1809.111578
Medscape, LLC is pleased to provide online continuing medical education (CME) for this journal article, allowing clinicians the
opportunity to earn CME credit.  
This activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the Essential Areas and policies of the Accreditation 
Council for Continuing Medical Education through the joint sponsorship of Medscape, LLC and Emerging Infectious Diseases. 
Medscape, LLC is accredited by the ACCME to provide continuing medical education for physicians. 
Medscape, LLC designates this Journal-based CME activity for a maximum of 1 AMA PRA Category 1 Credit(s)TM. Physicians 
should claim only the credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity. 
All other clinicians completing this activity will be issued a certificate of participation. To participate in this journal CME activity: 
(1) review the learning objectives and author disclosures; (2) study the education content; (3) take the post-test with a 70% minimum
passing score and complete the evaluation at www.medscape.org/journal/eid; (4) view/print certificate. 
Release date: August 16, 2012; Expiration date: August 16, 2013 
Learning Objectives 
Upon completion of this activity, participants will be able to: 
•  Assess measles vaccination and the prognosis of measles infection 
•  Distinguish the maximum amount of time permissible to initiate an outbreak response vaccination in order to prevent 
a large outbreak of measles 
•  Distinguish the maximum amount of time permissible to initiate an outbreak response vaccination in order to 
significantly affect the rate of measles infection at all  
•  Analyze the peak incidence rates of measles infection during a school outbreak 
CME Editor 
P. Lynne Stockton, VMD, MS, ELS(D), Technical Writer/Editor, Emerging Infectious Diseases. Disclosure: P. Lynne Stockton, 
VMD, MS, ELS(D), has disclosed no relevant financial relationships.
CME Author 
Charles P. Vega, MD, Health Sciences Clinical Professor; Residency Director, Department of Family Medicine, University of 
California, Irvine. Disclosure: Charles P. Vega, MD, has disclosed no relevant financial relationships. 
Authors 
Disclosures: Axel Antonio Bona i  Marinovi , PhD; Corien Swaan, MD; Ole Wichmann, MD; Jim van Steenbergen, MD, PhD;
and Mirjam Kretzschmar, PhD, have disclosed no relevant financial relationships. 
RESEARCH
campaigns. High baseline vaccination ratios extended the 
time needed for effective response.
Measles is a highly contagious disease that causes illness and death in developing and industrialized countries. 
Measles has an estimated basic reproduction number (R0) 
range of 12–40 (1–5), meaning that 1 case introduced into 
a susceptible (naive) population will produce, on average, 
that number of secondary cases. Worldwide, measles is the 
main vaccine-preventable cause of death among children; 
>31 million cases occur every year, and case-fatality rates 
for industrialized countries are ≈0.1%–0.2% (6). In 2001, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United 
Nations published a global strategic plan for measles (7); 
the aims of the plan are to sustainably reduce deaths from 
measles and to interrupt measles virus transmission in 
countries and regions with elimination objectives.
In 2002, the WHO Region of the Americas was 
declared free from endemic measles transmission, which 
was achieved by implementing immunization programs 
with very high vaccination coverage (>95%). This goal has 
not been achieved in the WHO European region, for which 
the target year for measles elimination was 2010. Measles is 
so highly contagious that the average vaccination coverage 
in Europe (80%–95%) (8) is not high enough to prevent 
outbreaks among nonvaccinated persons. The new target 
year for measles elimination in the WHO European region 
is 2015 (9).
The only means of protection against measles are prior 
infection or vaccination. Several studies have focused on 
the effectiveness of mass outbreak-response vaccination 
campaigns for controlling measles outbreaks in settings 
where incidence and morbidity and mortality rates are 
high. Although some studies suggest that mass outbreak-
response vaccination campaigns will not stop measles 
epidemics because of the rapid spread of the disease (10–
12), other studies, which used more recent data, show that 
outbreak-response vaccination campaigns can successfully 
reduce illness and death (13–17). The current WHO 
guidelines recommend mass outbreak-response vaccination 
campaigns when a measles outbreak is confi rmed in settings 
with a goal of reducing deaths from measles (18) and where 
most measles cases occur in children <5 years of age. 
There is no recommendation, however, for implementing 
outbreak-response vaccination campaigns in settings where 
incidence and morbidity and mortality rates are low, such 
as in the WHO European region. In these settings, because 
of the high baseline vaccination ratio (BVR), a shift in age 
distribution of measles cases toward older nonvaccinated 
school children is often noted (19). Consequently, outbreaks 
initially spread within relatively closed populations of 
children, such as schools or daycare centers, because of the 
high rate of social contact among nonvaccinated children 
in these establishments. Therefore, we focused our study 
on outbreak-response vaccination campaigns that targeted 
establishments with children where a measles outbreak was 
occurring in settings with high BVRs.
A delay from detection of an outbreak to implementation 
of an outbreak-response vaccination campaign to onset 
of an effective immune response of those vaccinated is 
inevitable. Because measles is highly contagious, many 
children might become infected during that delay. Thus, 
whether vaccinating children against measles during a 
school outbreak would substantially affect the outcome of 
a newly forming epidemic is in doubt (20). In this study, 
we used stochastic models to estimate the expected size of 
an outbreak in a school, depending on the delay between 
detection and implementation of complete school outbreak-
response vaccination campaign.
Methods
We based our stochastic model design on a combined 
compartmental and individual-based approach (Figure 
1). To set our baseline models, we calibrated the model 
parameters to fi t the data from a real school measles 
outbreak during which no outbreak-response vaccination 
campaign was implemented. Although detection of an 
outbreak depends on notifi cation and surveillance policies, 
we defi ned the beginning of the outbreak as the day on which 
the index case-patient showed clear signs of the disease 
because that is an objective starting point for the outbreak. 
We also defi ned the vaccination delay as the interval 
between the beginning of the outbreak and the day that the 
vaccination campaign was implemented at the school. For 
simplicity, we assumed that all nonvaccinated students were 
vaccinated on the day of implementation of the campaign. 
We used the calibrated model parameter values (Table) and 
investigated the outbreak size distribution by varying the 
vaccination delay. We computed 100,000 simulation runs 
for each model with different vaccination delays, ranging 
from day 0 (the same day that the outbreak began) to 150 
days, in intervals of 2 days; day 0 meant that the school 
outbreak-response vaccination campaign was implemented 
at the beginning of the outbreak.
The Model
We used a compartmental approach to describe the 
part of the population not yet infected. We considered 2 
subgroups—susceptible and vaccinated—to represent 
the nonvaccinated and vaccinated school populations, 
respectively, at the beginning of the outbreak. Susceptible 
persons were assumed to have been completely unexposed 
(naive) to measles virus and to have a high probability of 
becoming infected (Pinf) if they contacted an infectious 
person. Vaccinated persons were assumed to have acquired 
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protection from measles virus by vaccination and to have 
a reduced probability of becoming infected (Pinf,vac>0) to 
account for an imperfect vaccine.
For susceptible (or eventually a vaccinated) persons 
who became infected, the model took an individual-based 
approach and followed each person from the time of 
infection until the end of the simulation. Persons who had 
had measles before the outbreak were included as affected 
but were already immune to infection from the beginning 
of the simulation. Each affected person had individual 
transmission and clinical time lines, depending on time 
since infection, which varied from one person to another.
Disease History Time Lines 
From the moment a person became infected, and 
therefore affected, 2 parallel time lines were updated in 
1-day steps. The time lines describe the disease history: 
transmission and clinical (Figure 1). 
The transmission time line describes when the affected 
person became infectious, after a latent period of duration 
(Dlat), and when that person ceased to be infectious because 
the person recovered after the infectious period of duration 
(Dinf) had passed. Durations of these periods were generated 
randomly from their respective probability distributions 
(Table). After an affected person recovered, that person 
was unable to become infected again because of acquired 
life-long immunity. The transmission time line describes 
the events that dictate the dynamics of the epidemic, but in 
practice these events are diffi cult to observe.
In contrast, the clinical time line describes events 
that can actually be observed. This time line indicates 
the moment of the rash onset, after the incubation period 
(Dinc), and the moment when the affected person recovered 
from the disease, after the symptomatic period (Dsymp) had 
passed. The values of these periods for each affected person 
are drawn from the probability distributions indicated in 
the Table. For simplicity, we assumed that the symptomatic 
period ended at the same time that the infectious period 
ended.
Persons who had been infected before the outbreak 
were considered recovered at the start of our simulations. 
That is, they were at the end of their disease time lines and 
did not contribute to the fi nal size of the outbreak.
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of stochastic outbreak models to 
estimate the expected size of a measles outbreak in a school, 
depending on the delay between detection and implementation 
of a complete school outbreak-response vaccination campaign. 
Susceptible persons (susceptibles) become affected if they are 
infected and become vaccinated after vaccination is implemented. 
Vaccinated persons (vaccinated) can also be infected but with 
lower probability than susceptible persons. Those who become 
affected are followed individually, each with their own transmission 
and clinical time lines.
Table. Definitions of measles outbreak model parameters with assumed values and probability distribution* 
Model parameter Notation Value/distribution Reference 
Duration of incubation period (from 
distribution) 
Dinc Log normal (2.3,0.2); 7–14 d after infection,  
mode 10 d. 
(21–23) 
Duration of latent period (distribution) Dlat (Dinc  4) + normal (0.7); latent period ends 4 d 
before symptom onset. 
(21–23) 
Duration of infectious period  
(from distribution) 
Dinf (Dinc + 4  Dlat) + normal (0.7); infectious period 
ends 4 d after symptom onset. 
(21–23) 
Duration of symptomatic period  
(from distribution) 
Dsymp Dlat + Dinf  Dinc; assumes that symptomatic period 
ends at same time as infectious period. 
(21–23) 
Duration of period to build up immunity  
after vaccination (from distribution) 
Dimm 13.2 + normal (3.0); approximates measles-specific 
IgM positivity rates of 2% and 61% after 1 and 2 
weeks of vaccination, respectively. 
(24) 
Number of daily contacts per person  
(from distribution) 
ncont 20 + NegBin (0.155,2.2). (25) 
Infection probability of a susceptible person 
after contact with an infectious person 
Pinf 0.12 in the R0 16 scenario; 0.2348 in the  
R0 31 scenario. 
This article  
(Model Calibration) 
Vaccination effectiveness VES 0.9975. (5) 
Infection probability of a vaccinated person 
after contact with an infectious person 
Pinf,vac Pinf (1  VES ); 3  10–4 in the R0 16 scenario;  
5.869 × 10–4 in the R0 31 scenario.
This article 
(Vaccination)
*NegBin, negative binomial probability distribution; R0 16, scenario in which basic reproduction number R0 16 is considered; R0 31,  scenario in which 
basic reproduction number R0 31 is considered. 
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Infection
We assumed that every person in the school mixed 
with everybody, i.e., homogeneous mixing, and considered 
daily contact distribution as shown in the Table. Therefore, 
each day the number of contacts that an infectious affected 
person had (ncont) was drawn from this distribution. From 
these contacts, the number of newly infected susceptible 
and vaccinated persons was computed according to the 
infection probabilities, Pinf and Pinf,vac, respectively.
Vaccination
The percentage of vaccinated persons at the beginning 
of the outbreak was determined by the BVR, and we assumed 
that vaccination-acquired protection does not wane with 
time. The high effectiveness of the measles vaccine (5,26) 
implies that outbreaks occur mostly among those who 
are not vaccinated. The intervention strategy consisted of 
vaccinating all school children without documented measles 
vaccination; the goal was 100% vaccination coverage. This 
strategy infl uences only the susceptible persons by reducing 
their probability of becoming infected to Pinf,vac = (1-VES)
Pinf, where VES is the vaccine effectiveness value (Table). 
Susceptible persons are not protected at the moment of 
vaccination because the immune response to the vaccine 
takes time to develop. These persons remain susceptible for 
a period ([Dimm]; probability distribution is indicated in the 
Table) after the vaccination day and then become part of 
the vaccinated group.
Isolation
Usually, persons with measles stay home while 
recovering from the disease. Therefore, we assumed that 
after disease symptoms developed (after the incubation 
period Dinc), infected persons stopped attending school. 
This absenteeism prevents further contact at school and 
further spread of the disease, even if the affected person 
remains infectious at home. For this study, we ignored the 
possibility of siblings attending the same school.
Model Calibration
We calibrated our models by using data from a 
retrospective cohort study conducted at a public day school 
in Duisburg, Germany, where a large measles outbreak had 
occurred in 2006 (19,27). The fi rst cluster in this epidemic 
had occurred at that school, providing a typical scenario 
for the early behavior of an outbreak. The outbreak 
data consisted of a population of 1,250 schoolchildren 
10–21 years of age (median 14 years), of which a high 
proportion (91.3%–94.3%), were vaccinated; 62 students 
had a history of measles before the outbreak, and a total 
of 55 cases were confi rmed (5,27). Because no outbreak-
response vaccination campaign had been implemented, 
we calibrated the infection probability (Pinf) in our models 
to describe this situation. Assuming a BVR of 91.3%, 
calculated by Wichmann et al. (27), we adjusted the 
infection probability (Pinf) in our models so that the size 
distribution of large outbreaks from our simulations peaked 
at 55 cases. The calibrated Pinf value in combination with 
our assumed contact distribution (Table) translated into a 
basic reproduction number of R0≈16, which is consistent 
with reported basic reproduction number estimations for 
measles (1–4). The calibrated Pinf value in combination with 
a BVR of 91.3% yielded roughly an effective reproduction 
number (Reff) as follows: Reff≈R0[1−(BVR/100%)] = 1.4. In 
theory, if BVR is high enough that Reff is <1, then 1 case 
generates on average <1 secondary case, leading to herd 
immunity effects and no large outbreaks (1–4,28).
In a later study, van Boven et al. (5) used a Bayesian 
method to estimate the BVR at 94.3%. Considering this 
BVR, a higher infection probability (Pinf) is needed in our 
models to reproduce the observed outbreak size, which 
translates to a higher basic reproduction number, R0≈31, 
needed to produce an outbreak in a population with such 
a high BVR. The conditions in this scenario yield an Reff 
of ≈1.8, indicating that our simulated outbreaks spread 
more quickly and had higher attack rates than in the less 
contagious case of R0≈16 and Ref≈1.4. To obtain equivalent 
outbreak sizes, the attack rate (percentage of affected 
susceptible persons) has to be higher in a population in 
which BVR is larger because the number of susceptible 
children is smaller.
Figure 2 shows the fi nal size distribution histograms 
for R0≈16 and R0≈31. The typical bimodal distribution 
predicted by stochastic models appears in both scenarios 
(28) but is most pronounced for the case of R0≈31. The 
bimodal distribution arises because it is always possible that 
chance events will cause a new outbreak to die out before 
becoming large. We interpreted the local minimum in both 
distributions of Figure 2 (i.e., an outbreak size of 20) as 
a natural but arbitrary limit to distinguish between small 
and large outbreaks. Therefore, although both distributions 
show a most probable large outbreak size of 55 persons, in 
the R0≈16 model, 39% of the simulated outbreaks instances 
become large outbreaks, and in the R0≈31 model, 64% of 
the instances become large.
Results
Figure 3 shows the fi nal size distribution of outbreaks 
as a function of the model vaccination delay indicated in the 
x-axis for the R0≈16 model. Because of the stochastic nature 
of the model, as a result of chance events, some outbreaks 
died out before the intervention was implemented, as could 
happen in real life. To study the effect of the intervention, 
we considered only those outbreaks that were still 
developing at the moment of vaccination. The longer it 
took to implement the vaccination campaign, the more the 
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outbreak size distributions shifted toward larger outbreaks. 
Outbreaks were expected to remain small (<20 infected 
children) if the vaccination delay was 12–24 days. Although 
the reaction must be quick to avoid an outbreak involving 
>20 children, a reaction as late as 50 days reduced the fi nal 
size of large outbreaks in 95% of the simulations. With 
vaccination delays of >80–90 days, the expected outbreak 
size was similar to that when no vaccination campaign was 
implemented.
We also considered the scenario described by van 
Boven et al. (5), who based the R0≈31 estimate on the same 
school outbreak with a high BVR (94.3%). The high R0 
value of 31 implies that the infection is more contagious 
than that in our R0≈16 model, leading to a higher effective 
reproduction number. Figure 4 shows that the outbreak 
size distributions shifted toward larger outbreaks if the 
vaccination delay was longer, similar to the R0≈16 model. 
However, because of the higher infectiousness of the 
disease, outbreaks spread more quickly than in the models 
with R0≈16. This provided only a small time frame of 
6–14 days to implement the vaccination campaign if the 
outbreak size was to be kept small (<20 persons). In 95% 
of the simulations, a vaccination campaign implemented 
as late as 40 days after start of the outbreak reduced the 
fi nal size of the outbreak. There was almost no difference 
between implementing an outbreak-response campaign 
after ≈60 days and not implementing one at all.
From those outbreaks that did not die out before the 
vaccination campaign was implemented, we computed 
the percentage of those that would become large. This 
percentage can be interpreted as the probability that an 
outbreak will become large. The dependency of this 
percentage on the vaccination delay is shown in Figure 
5, where a range limited by the larger and smaller R0 
cases is considered. The large outbreak percentage was 
reduced to 31%–59% if the outbreak-response vaccination 
campaign was implemented with a delay of 28 days, and 
it was reduced further if the campaign was implemented 
earlier: 17%–42% with a 21-day delay, 7%–23% with a 14-
day delay, and 1%–7% with a 7-day delay. Although the 
percentage of large outbreaks became increasingly larger 
as delay to vaccination became larger, later implementation 
of outbreak-response vaccination campaigns might still 
substantially reduce the size of large outbreaks (Figures 3 
and 4).
To extend our study to different settings, we ran 
simulations in the same school setting and assumed 
various BVRs, the lowest being 80%, comparable to the 
current situation in Europe (8) (Figure 6). Outbreaks with 
a higher R0 developed more quickly under the same initial 
conditions and did not become large if the BVR was high 
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Figure 2. Measles outbreak size histograms calculated with 
calibrated models. The y-axis indicates the number of model 
instances counted in their corresponding outbreak size histogram 
bin, indicated in the x-axis. The dotted line indicates the limit 
from which large and small outbreaks are defi ned. BVR, 
baseline vaccination ratio; R0, reproduction number, Reff, effective 
reproduction number.
Figure 3. Distribution of measles outbreak sizes as function of 
vaccination delay for models with basic reproduction number (R0) 
of ≈16 and baseline vaccination ratio (BVR) of 91.3% (effective 
reproduction number ≈1.4). We considered the outbreaks that were 
still ongoing at the day of implementation of the outbreak-response 
vaccination campaign and not those that had spontaneously died 
out earlier by chance. For every given vaccination delay, the 
squares indicate the most likely large outbreak size, and the thick 
solid line indicates the median outbreak size value. The thin solid 
lines indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, and the tiny dotted lines 
indicate 5th and 95th percentiles of the outbreak size distribution 
as a function of vaccination delay. The dashed line shows the 
outbreak size from the observed data, and the dotted line indicates 
the chosen limit to separate large and small outbreaks.
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enough to achieve herd immunity (>93.8% and >96.8% for 
R0≈16 and R0≈31, respectively). For lower BVRs, the fi nal 
size was larger and outbreaks spread more quickly because 
of a larger effective reproduction number. Therefore, the 
time frame to react is smaller; e.g., if BVR = 80% and 
R0≈16, a 1-week delay is already long enough to expect 
large outbreaks, but a reaction within 3–4 weeks might 
substantially reduce the outbreak size. Some outbreak sizes 
were larger than the number of nonvaccinated children in 
the population, which is explained by imperfect vaccine 
producing an effect similar to a lower BVR.
We considered a school of 1,250 children, but there are 
many smaller institutions. In a simulation for a school of 
500 children, while conserving the proportions of children 
with a history of measles and BVR, the boundary separating 
large and small outbreaks changed to 13 persons. However, 
results regarding the timing of vaccination remained 
approximately the same.
Discussion
We calculated results for 2 reproduction number 
values, 31 and 16, which belong to a range that is high 
when compared with published estimates of the basic 
reproduction number of measles (R0≈8–18) (1–4). This 
comparison indicates that our results are rather conservative 
with regard to how quickly the intervention should be 
implemented. However, it must be noted that our results 
apply to schools in Europe for which BVRs were average 
(>80%) before the outbreak (8).
When we considered institutions with smaller 
populations than that considered in our study, timing for 
vaccination remained roughly the same. This fi nding is 
explained by the association between the time to react 
effectively and the generation interval of infection, which 
is the average time it will take for a newly infected person 
to infect someone else. The generation interval will depend 
mostly on the within-host disease development, as long as 
children have enough contacts to transmit the disease, even 
in schools with ≈300 children (25).
We considered our contact structure to be homogeneous 
mixing. More intricate contact networks, such as those 
considering clustering in the different classrooms of 
the school, popularity of some children, and household 
contacts with siblings attending the same school, might 
better resemble reality. Some network structures, contact 
rates, and superspreading events can infl uence the speed 
and growth of an epidemic (29). However, our baseline 
simulations had peak incidence during weeks 6–11 (16th 
and 84th percentiles, respectively), mode 7 weeks, for the 
R0≈31 scenario; and weeks 6–14, mode 8 weeks, for the 
R0≈16 scenario. These data are consistent with the real 
outbreak described by Wichmann et al. (27), indicating that 
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Figure 4. Distribution of measles outbreak sizes as function of 
vaccination delay for models with basic reproduction number (R0) 
of ≈31 and baseline vaccination ratio (BVR) of 94.3% (effective 
reproduction number ≈1.8). We considered the outbreaks that were 
still ongoing at the day of implementation of the outbreak-response 
vaccination campaign and not those that had spontaneously died 
out earlier by chance. For every given vaccination delay, the 
squares indicate the most likely large outbreak size, and the thick 
solid line indicates the median outbreak size value. The thin solid 
lines indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, and the tiny dotted lines 
indicate 5th and 95th percentiles of the outbreak size distribution 
as a function of vaccination delay. The dashed line shows the 
outbreak size from the observed data, and the dotted line indicates 
the chosen limit to separate large and small outbreaks.
Figure 5. Percentage of measles outbreaks that become large 
for the indicated models. We considered those outbreaks that 
are ongoing at the moment of implementation of the vaccination 
campaign, indicated by the vaccination delay in the x-axis. 
BVR, baseline vaccination ratio; R0≈16, scenario in which basic 
reproduction number R0≈16 is considered; R0≈31, scenario in 
which basic reproduction number R0≈31 is considered; Reff, effective 
reproduction number.
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the rate of disease spread in our simulations was similar to 
that in the real outbreak.
At the moment of vaccination, a person might already 
be infected but not yet symptomatic or might become 
infected soon after vaccination, before immunity has had 
time to develop. We assume that in these cases the disease 
progresses in the same way it does in nonvaccinated persons. 
However, there is evidence that vaccinating during the 
incubation period might mitigate the symptoms of measles 
infection (30). The vaccine might act as postexposure 
prophylaxis, potentially reducing the infectiousness of the 
vaccinated persons.
In many schools in Europe a BVR >80% can be found, 
but in communities with rather low BVRs (e.g., because 
of religious or philosophic beliefs), measles virus spreads 
much quicker. For example, in an outbreak originating in an 
anthroposophic community in Austria during 2008, with a 
BVR of 0.6%, of the 123 cases in the anthroposophic school 
of that community, 96% occurred during the fi rst 4 weeks 
of the outbreak (31), indicating that most cases were either 
second or third generation (the index case is considered 
the fi rst generation). An outbreak-response vaccination 
campaign during such a rapidly spreading outbreak would 
be effective in a school setting only if implemented within 
1 average generation interval ≈9 days) to avoid third-
generation infection, which is logistically diffi cult and 
requires 100% compliance. However, because school 
outbreaks are often part of larger community outbreaks, 
vaccination activities focused on susceptible persons 
should be promoted in the broader community at any time 
to prevent further spread of the disease, independent from 
the time of a school outbreak.
In our study, we assumed 100% compliance to the 
vaccination strategy. But high compliance to a vaccination 
campaign cannot be expected in regions with low BVRs 
associated with religious or philosophical beliefs that are 
opposed to vaccination. The compliance needed for an 
intervention to be effective should ensure herd immunity 
(≈95% vaccinated children). Other complementary 
measures can be implemented to control measles outbreaks 
at schools when no vaccination compliance is expected. 
For example, a measure such as the temporary exclusion 
of students who lack documented vaccination or whose 
parents do not agree to vaccination of their children 
might have a limited effect on preventing further spread 
of measles by itself (20,32). However, a combination of 
timely vaccination of all susceptible students at school who 
agree to be vaccinated and temporary exclusion of those 
who do not would be the most effective way to control a 
measles outbreak in a school.
In conclusion, we computed the possible outcomes of 
a measles outbreak in a school according to the vaccination 
delay, assuming that all potentially susceptible children in 
the school were vaccinated on the same day. We found that 
it is possible to reduce the number of cases during a measles 
outbreak in a school by applying a schoolwide vaccination 
strategy within a realistic time frame. Subsequently, 
because disease tends to spread in schools during the early 
stages of a city outbreak, reducing the effects of school 
outbreaks should help reduce the extent of the outbreak 
in the larger community. We also showed that BVRs that 
are high (>80%) but not high enough to achieve herd 
immunity (≈95%) keep the number of susceptible persons 
low, reduce the size of an outbreak, and reduce the speed 
at which the disease spreads, thereby increasing the time 
frame for mounting an effective intervention.
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Figure 6. Measles outbreak size ranges as function of vaccination 
delay, for models with basic reproduction number R0≈16 (A) 
and R0≈31 (B) in the same school setting with various baseline 
vaccination ratios (BVRs). The ranges shown are between the 95th 
and 50th percentiles of the outbreak size distribution as a function 
of vaccination delay and are calculated for each BVR indicated.
RESEARCH
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